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The economy on a cusp
The proposed VAT amendments and their larger significance
Debates on the revision of the value-added tax (VAT) are about to reach the
penultimate stage. Once house and senate have passed their respective versions
of the bill, congress – through a bicameral conference committee sometimes
referred to as the “third chamber” – must then agree on the final form of the law.
After all the media-posturing, the politicking, and horse-trading have subsided,
politicians of both chambers are still left to confront the nation’s true interests –
and their own consciences. It is vital that they finally pass a law that is right in form
and adequate to the economy’s needs.
The shape of the VAT law that is ultimately passed will dictate whether or not the
country remains on a fiscal sickbed. Contrary to government pronouncements, the
Philippine economy is not yet out of fiscal trouble. Notwithstanding all that has
occurred, the country, in our view, still needs to raise the rough equivalent of one
percent of GDP in additional revenues (around P54 billion in 2005) simply to
placate financial markets and pave the way for the refinancing of maturing debts
(thereby avoiding a future default).
Failure to pass an adequate VAT law would be most inopportune, particularly when
the national government is expected once more to tap international credit markets
in September this year for the amount of some $3 billion. Indeed the mild
treatment Philippine government debt paper received despite Moody’s two-step
downgrade was due to the fact that markets had already factored in the passage
of a satisfactory VAT law. Without such a law, on the other hand, if a credit-
downgrade or massive loss of confidence in Philippine sovereign debt should
occur, borrowing costs could rise by 300 basis points (i.e., three percentage
points) and cost the nation an additional P5 billion in just one episode. That
burden would multiply as the country continued to borrow and its ratings continued
to decline. More profound than this, however, are the social, economic and
financial costs to the nation if one considers – as one should – the
macroeconomic instability and uncertainty that are bound to follow upon a debt-
payments crisis. (Among other things, recent favourable trends in the exchange-
rate and the stock market could very quickly reverse.)
Beyond merely overcoming the “Moody’s blues” and placating its creditors,
however, the government must seriously respond to the people’s need for
development and expand the budgets of vital social services and infrastructure: to
do this it actually needs to raise the equivalent of another percentage point of GDP
in revenue at the very least.
Table 1
Selected items of government spending
(as percentages of nominal GDP)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Primary spending1 16.25 15.04 14.76 14.95 13.96 12.86
Education 3.39 3.23 3.05 3.03 2.99 2.69
Health 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.23
Infrastructure outlays 1.85 1.94 1.77 1.51 1.41 1.06
Memorandum:
Personal services 7.24 7.01 6.82 6.77 6.42 6.16
1Expenditures less interest payments
Source: Department of Budget and Management
Government spending net of debt service (i.e., primary spending) grew in nominal
terms only by 1.4 percent in 2003 and 3.9 percent in 2004. These increases failed
to keep pace even with the rate of inflation. As a proportion of GDP, primary
spending has fallen more or less continuously from 16 percent in 1999 to less
than 13 percent in 2004 (Table 1). By the end of this year it will have shrunk by the
equivalent of 2.7 percentage points of GDP (1.09 and 1.61 percent in 2004 and
2005, respectively).
Social services spending has mirrored this decline: as a proportion of GDP,
spending on education dropped from 3.4 percent in 1999 to only 2.7 in 2004,
while health spending fell from less than half a percent to less than a quarter of a
percent of GDP. Similarly, spending on infrastructure is now barely one percent of
GDP.
More alarming is the fact that the 2005 budget even projects a contraction of
primary spending by 2.8 percent in absolute (nominal) terms. The decrease in real
terms, of course, is much larger. The cuts would bring primary spending down to
only 11.9 percent of GDP. While there are those who would argue that spending
compression cuts fat – about which there can be no argument – what is even more
obvious is that expenditure cuts are hitting not just fat but bone and muscle as well.
The result is the present state of affairs where, among other things, the secretary
of education must grovel before private charity simply to rebuild schoolhouses in
Quezon levelled by last year’s the storms and landslides; and where, rather than
have supervised school lunches, scores of young children must die of food
poisoning from ill-prepared street food. In the meantime, the government has also
cancelled hundreds of millions of pesos in foreign official grants for want of
counterpart funds.
If the nation’s politicians would only care to look, the magnitude of the task would
be clear enough. The legislature’s target should be to raise roughly P108 billion in
revenue or in reallocated spending in 2005. Roughly half of this is the minimum
needed to stave off a fiscal crisis; the other half is required to restore vital social
services to even halfway-decent levels.
The score so far
How do actual accomplishments measure up? Thus far congress has really
passed only one significant revenue measure: the updating of tobacco and
alcoholic beverage excises, or the so-called “sin taxes”. By most estimates this
measure will raise at most P6.7 billion this year, with perhaps succeeding three-
percent increments in the next two years. Unfortunately even this gives mixed
signals. The measure could have raised as much as P14 billion if only congress
had not surrendered on the one crucial issue of re-classifying products to reflect
their current prices rather than those that prevailed in 1997. This fact confirms the
suspicion that certain interests remain sacrosanct. Furthermore, it retains the
inherent inflexibility of a specific tax system whose adjustment is hostage to the
whims of congress. It was this very feature that contributed largely to the fiscal
crisis in the first place, as tax revenues on big items such as alcohol, tobacco, and
petroleum failed to keep pace with the changes in economic activity because they
were invariant to changes in the prices of these goods.
The only other significant fiscal “reform” legislated thus far occurred unintentionally
when the senate passed the house version of the budget without revision. That
budget contained the original 40-percent cut in pork-barrel funds submitted by the
executive, slicing off approximately P8.5 billion from the budget. By making it
possible to run a smaller deficit than otherwise, the cuts should be lauded for
lowering the debt-trajectory. It is naïve, however, to think the savings will recur in
future budgets. Be that as it may, however, this is at least still “burden-sharing” –
no matter how grudging and unintended – and people should be grateful enough
not to look a gift-horse in the mouth.
Still, relative to the goal of P54 billion in added revenue simply to avert a crisis –
not to mention the P108 billion for both stabilisation and even a minimal recovery
of social spending – these achievements are paltry, indeed. The current tenor of
developments bodes ill even for the administration’s own programme of legislative
revenue measures (Table 2). Of eight revenue measures the Arroyo administration
originally proposed, only two have been passed (of which one even has a dubious
revenue impact) while four have been abandoned.
Table 2.
The administration’s original legislative revenue programme
(projected yield in billions of pesos)
Yield Status
Sin product indexation 9.1 Passed in diluted form; yield P6.7 bn
Rationalization of fiscal incentives 5.0 Pending (partly covered by
VAT proposal)
Raising the VAT 30.0 Pending
Tax on telecommunications 9.1 Abandoned
Excise tax on petroleum products 28.0
Abandoned/postponed?/replaced by VAT inclusion?
Adoption of gross income tax 16.8 Abandoned
Total 97.0
Memo:
General tax amnesty 25.00 Abandoned; one-off increase
Lateral attrition law --- Passed (of unknown revenue impact)
Source: Philippine medium term development plan 2004-2010, Chapter 7, pp. 97
-98.
To be sure, some of these proposals did not even deserve to see the light of day:
tax amnesties are well-known failures, and gross-income taxation is highly suspect
in terms of horizontal equity and its economic impact. Be that as it may, what is
clear is that the administration’s programme is now tattered and mangled. For this
the Arroyo administration itself must assume some responsibility for its precipitate
pronouncements and lacklustre leadership; but the legislature’s obduracy and its
vulnerability to lobbying by powerful vested interests are also partly to blame. If
towards the end of 2004 the administration envisioned P97-122 billion from its
programme, it can now expect less than P42 billion even under its own
assumptions. As stated above and argued in detail below, however, this amount is
barely sufficient to fill the minimal requirements of stabilising the debt, much
responding to people’s needs.
What becomes even clearer, however, is the pivotal role the VAT measure now
plays in the equation. The VAT amendment is now the only significant revenue
measure that is still active and pending; it has become, like it or not, the
centrepiece of the Arroyo administration’s fiscal reform programme. Without a
credible law that increases the VAT rate now (and expands its coverage later) the
government’s fiscal reform programme has no leg to stand on.
VAT’s supposed regressiveness
This brings us then to the main point: just how good are the VAT-related proposals
currently on the table? Two criteria must be applied: the first is whether the
revenue raised is adequate to the task. For this is certainly entire point of the
effort. Second, however, one must ask whether and how any social inequity and
economic distortion can be avoided or mitigated without sacrificing this principal
task.
The original idea – a proposal we originally supported as part of a burden-sharing
package – was simply to increase the VAT rate from the current 10 percent to 12
percent. If nothing else is done, this is estimated to yield an additional amount of
P30-35 billion, a figure broadly in line with the government’s own projections when
it assumes a 70 percent VAT-collection efficiency (first row in Table 3). We
continue to hold that as a bare minimum, an increase in the VAT rate from 10 to 12
is an inevitable and basic component of any adequate formula to address the
fiscal crisis. Nor would a 12-percent rate, if adopted, be internationally out of line:
while it is true that a 10-percent VAT appears to be a rule of thumb for the region
(e.g., for Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia), none of of these other countries faces a
fiscal crisis of the magnitude the Philippines does. On the other hand 15 percent is
the level of China’s VAT, as well as the average for fiscally troubled Latin America.
Finance department computations suggest that, when combined with the removal
of a number of unwarranted VAT exemptions, such as those on medical and legal
services, cooperatives, and various fuels, petroleum products, the higher VAT rate
could result in revenues approaching P63 billion (Table 3), assuming 70-percent
efficiency in collection . In terms of the stipulated benchmark, such a measure may
be adequate to fulfil the demands of debt stabilisation, but it would only begin to
alleviate the pressing requirements for social and infrastructure spending (recall
the benchmark of P108 billion). Moreover, with respect to the removal of some
major exemptions, particularly those on petroleum, there could be difficulties with
timing, as we discuss further below. In
Table 3.
Yield from raising VAT rate to 12 percent and
repealing selected VAT exemptions
(70% collection efficiency assumed; yield in billion pesos )
Yield
Increase of VAT to 12 % 35.12
Repeal of VAT exemptions 27.64
Particulars of which:
Coal and natural gas 0.34
Petroleum products 8.62
Raw materials for petroleum products 11.77
Vessels of more than 5000 tonnes 0.002
Cooperatives 4.87
Books 0.23
Medical services 1.37
Legal services 0.44
Total 62.76
Source: Department of Finance estimates (4 March 2005)
The simple proposal to raise the VAT rate from 10 to 12 percent has since been
mangled, however. The principal objection lodged against it is not that it fails to
raise significant revenue – for it obviously does – but that it is inequitable. Such a
casual observation, often allowed to pass unanswered, has since led a number of
politicians to tinker with the simple VAT law and to propose any or all of the
following: from the house come proposals exempting or privileging certain
manufactured goods consumed by the poor (e.g., instant noodles, canned
sardines), as well as instituting multi-tiered VAT rates, with zero or lower rates on
certain goods presumably consumed by the poor. From the senate, more
significantly, comes the general proposal of opposing any increase in the VAT rate
in favour of simply broadening its coverage.
To the extent it is used as a rationale, in the first place, the myth must be dispelled
that the VAT in general – including any additional amount to be imposed – is paid
only minimally by the affluent, and that most of the revenue would be collected
from the middle classes and the poor. Media has repeated the assertion, for
example, that only two percent of the VAT is paid by “the rich”, 44 percent by the
“very poor”, and 54 percent by the “middle classes”. Such claims do not seem to
jibe with the facts.
Of course, since richer households can save more, VAT paid reckoned as a
proportion of household income, may fall as income rises; by this measure it is
moderately regressive. The National Tax Research Center (NTRC) estimates the
effective VAT rate is 5.2 percent for people who earn P20,000 or less, while those
making P500,000 or more pay 3.66 percent of their income as VAT. Nonetheless
economic theory posits expenditure (i.e., consumption) rather than income as the
proper basis for measuring progressiveness, since not paying taxes on income
saved at most postpones but does not avoid tax payment. (This is all the more
true, since interest income from savings is also subject to a tax of 20 percent.)
Using household expenditures as a tax base, therefore, it is not surprising that the
VAT is in fact mildly progressive. There are two factors at work here. First,
because consumption like income is highly concentrated, any consumption tax is
more likely to fall on the rich. To illustrate using figures for 2000, the richest 10
percent of the population accounted for 35 percent of all spending in the country
(column 3 and last two rows of Table 4). This, of course, merely confirms a well
known fact, namely, that incomes and wealth are unequally distributed, but it also
suggests that it is the rich who are more likely to pay the VAT than the poor.
Second, goods consumed by the rich are more liable to be subject to VAT than
those consumed by the poor. In the Philippines, the exemption of a number of
goods consumed largely by the poor (e.g., agricultural products, unprocessed
food, and kerosene) has meant that the proportion of a household’s consumption
subject to VAT increases as the household becomes richer. Again Table 4 (third
column) shows that somewhat less than half of consumption in the poorest half of
the population is subject to VAT, but that this figure rises to 64 percent for the
next-richest nine percent and to more than 75 percent for the very richest one
percent of the population. (This despite the fact that some items pre-eminently
consumed by the rich – such as air travel and jewelry – are unjustifiably VAT
exempt, a matter discussed further below.)
Table 4.
VAT paid by expenditure percentiles
Percentile
Share (%)
of total
spending Percentile
spending
liable to
VAT (%) Share (%)
in total
VAT due
Poorest 1% 0.1 44.2 0.1
1-10% 1.9 45.9 1.4
10-25% 5.2 48.4 4.1
25-50% 13.2 53.0 11.5
50-75% 22.1 58.4 21.2
75-90% 22.3 61.9 22.7
90-99% 25.0 63.8 26.3
Richest 1% 10.1 75.8 12.6
Sources: FIES 2000, Fletcher [2005] and own computations
The net result of both factors is that almost 40 percent of the VAT is due from the
richest 10 percent of the population, while only 17.1 percent is due from the
poorest half. As a proportion of spending, the effective VAT rises from 4.6
percent of spending for the poorest decile to 7.6 percent for the richest one
percent. In this sense the existing VAT is actually progressive and probably more
so than some forms of income tax, which are progressive in principle but barely
collected in practice. The bulk of personal income taxes, for example, is paid by
many non-rich wage- and salary-earners who are captured by the withholding tax
system; meanwhile many rich non-wage earners slip through the cracks.
Even as an indirect tax, the VAT is less regressive than other indirect taxes (e.g.,
the “sin” taxes). Indeed, as demonstrated above, the VAT is actually mildly
progressive. Still, of course, it cannot rival the potential progressiveness of a direct
tax. Difficulties in the collection of income and wealth taxes in the Philippines are
legion and well known, however, so that large changes in direct-tax collection are
unlikely to be forthcoming soon. So this brings up a general point about tax
collection in the Philippines that turns textbook prescriptions on their heads: an
effectively collected indirect tax can be more progressive in practice than a poorly
collected direct tax. From this viewpoint, the VAT does not come out looking too
bad.
Those parts of VAT that make it progressive would undoubtedly be further
enhanced if unconscionable exemptions of some goods consumed by the rich
were withdrawn. These can and ought to be done. There was no compelling
economic or social reason, for example, that a resort to law suits and to botox
injections and liposuctions should have been exempted from a consumption tax in
the first place. The removal of exemptions favouring affluent consumption is
certain to enhance progressiveness and should be vigorously pursued. But even if
redistributive equity were not served, they should still be removed simply because
doing so would raise more revenue and reduce economic distortions. (As an
aside, it is an alarming aspect of some current proposals that even as they remove
some exemptions, they retain other unjustifiable ones, including such a luxury as
air travel.)
Still it should be remembered that it is not the main purpose of a consumption tax
to be progressive but rather, in being uniform, to raise revenue in the simple and
less distortive manner for the economy. A consumption tax would fulfil its function
of simple and minimally distortive revenue generation, even if it were simply
proportional, or perhaps even mildly regressive. The particular virtue of a single
rate is that it makes compliance easy to monitor and hence more collection more
effective. The application of a uniform rate also means that no particular types of
consumption or of stages of production activities are privileged.
Mangling a simple proposal
By contrast, current proposals appear to have lost sight of the original purpose of
a value-added tax and seek instead to address everyone’s pet-issue in a single
measure – as if the government had no other tools at its disposal to address the
various social problems being raised.
The economist Jan Tinbergen originated the well-known adage in macroeconomic
planning that one cannot have more goals than the number of instruments
available. For the same reason, no single measure can be expected at a single
stroke to effectively raise revenue in an unbiased manner and also alleviate
poverty, redistribute income, provide safety nets, help small businesses, and
define industrial priorities to boot. Yet it is precisely this gargantuan task some
legislators would have VAT achieve. In truth, however, to hold out the illusion that
the VAT measure can and should do all these is to perpetrate a sham upon the
public. Behind it all can lurk only either ignorance, tokenism, vested interests – or
all these.
As an example, apart from the obvious demand that the VAT should raise sizeable
revenues, the measure is now also expected to serve as an anti-poverty
programme, in addition to being its own safety net! On this argument, proposals
have been made to exempt instant noodles and canned sardines from the VAT or,
in the senate version, to increase their presumptive VAT input credits (Table 5,
item 6) on such things as sardines, mackerel, cooking oil, and refined sugar.
The folly and tokenism behind such proposals become apparent once one
considers the following: First, not all who are poor consume only instant noodles
and canned sardines. What about those, for instance, who eat wheat not as
noodles but as cheap baked products? This is the problem in poverty-alleviation
called inadequate scope. Second, not all instant noodles and canned sardines are
consumed only by the poor (the “leaky-bucket” problem). Should premium
Japanese instant noodles and premium canned sardines (imported and local
ones) also be VAT-exempt? Who is to say which is which? Third, another leaky-
bucket problem, not all who consume instant noodles and canned sardines are
poor. Does a rich person addicted to instant noodles, whether cheap or
expensive, deserve an exemption? Finally a lower VAT rate or a higher VAT
exemption on specific goods is hardly the only way to help the poor, and likely not
the best, either. A reallocation of spending towards better social priorities would
probably do more good. More importantly, ad hoc rate-discounts and exemptions
detract from the main function of a consumption tax, which is to raise revenue.
Overburdening the VAT revision with such impossible subsidiary goals only risks
its failure in its principal task. In particular, a multi-tier system (such as the 4-6-8-12
proposal from the house) that seeks to achieve these “pro-poor” objectives
unnecessarily complicates the collection of the tax as well as encourages evasion.
Worst of all, however, any further addition to the list of exemptions runs the risk of
capture by vested interests. It should be remembered that virtually no tax – not
even a consumption tax like the VAT – is ever paid entirely by consumers alone.
Producers must also typically bear part of the burden to the extent that the higher
price caused by a tax compels them to raise prices, lowers demand, and leads to
lower profits. Hence it will always be in the interest of producers to lobby
vigorously to exempt themselves from the VAT, or to be spared any increase.
Under the guise of providing protection to the unfortunate and poor, for instance,
VAT exemptions in the past have been used to give privileges to some fortunate
non-poor sectors of the economy, including big publishing outfits, housing
developers, lawyers and law firms, and doctors (not to mention entertainers and
sports personalities in the past).
Table 5.
New exemptions and other
revenue-losing measures considered
Remarks
Zero-rating
1. Services for persons doing business outside RP
2. Sales to persons engaged in international shipping
or international air transport
Higher exemptions
3. Sale of real properties not greater than P1.5 million raises existing
ceiling from P1 million
4. Lease of residential units rentals up to P10,000 monthly raises existing
ceiling from P8,000
5. Entities with gross annual sales of P750,000 or less raises existing
ceiling from P550,000
6. Higher presumptive input tax in processing of sardines, mackerel, milk, refined
sugar, cooking oil
Reduction of non-VAT taxes
7. Raising the corporate income tax from 32 to 35 percent and lowering it to 30
percent beginning 2009
8. Deleted 3-percent tax on quarterly gross receipts of international air carriers
doing business in RP
9. Deleted 3-percent tax on quarterly gross receipts of international shipping
carriers doing business in RP
10. Exempting electric utilities (e.g., Meralco) from paying the franchise tax equal
to 2-percent on gross receipts
11. Waiving amusement taxes on cabarets,
night- or day-clubs currently taxed at 18%
Reduction of petroleum products excises
12. Lower tax on naptha to P4.35 from P4.80/litre
13. Zero tax on kerosene from P0.60/litre
14. Zero tax on diesel fuel from P1.63/litre
15. Zero tax on bunker fuel From P0.30/litre
It is well and good that the removal of some of these is being sought, although in
the next section we shall warn against careless tinkering. It is disturbing however
not only that many exemptions will remain, that new ones are being inserted.
(a) Except for the first item, none of these proposals in Table 5 is unequivocally
justified on economic or equity grounds. One of the most controversial of these
new exemptions is the proposal under HB 3705 in favour of international air
transport and shipping operators (Table 4, items 2, 8, and 9). A BIR ruling currently
allows such operators to impose no VAT on international passengers and cargo
(in lieu of which there is a travel tax), and they are charged no VAT on their inputs
either. The proposal, if accepted, would not only exempt these operators from
VAT but also allow them to (a) refund any VAT paid on their inputs, (including
imports or lease of aircraft or ships, imports of petroleum, and aircraft and
shipping parts and supplies) or (

credit this against their income-taxes and other
duties (zero-rating). In addition, the three-percent tax on quarterly gross receipts
from such carriers will no longer be charged. The question, of course, is why?
There is a valid economic reason for exempting international carriers from VAT in
principle. It is the same reason one VAT-exempts exporters who must sell their
products abroad, namely to put them on equal footing with the foreign competition.
To the extent that these operators serve foreign passengers and handle foreign-
related cargo, they are exporters and should not charge a VAT on foreigners. On
the other hand, it would also be unfair to national carriers to subject their inputs to
VAT if they did not have an output VAT against which to credit it. Thus far, the
current system.
But the proposal goes too far. First, it maintains the VAT-free status of these
operators. Second, it rescinds an already-existing gross-receipts tax. Third and
more significantly, however, it zero-rates their inputs. That is, they are not merely
exempt from paying VAT (as they already are under the existing system), now they
may instead pay the VAT on their inputs then credit this amount against income-
and other taxes. This is especially beneficial to carriers doing both domestic and
international business, since then the VAT input-credits might be set off against
taxes on profits arising from both sides of the business.
It is a sad commentary on this entire discussion that the proper distinction among
consumption,` intermediate inputs, and export of services has been lost. For
example, a personal trip taken by Filipinos to Boracay or to Hong Kong is (luxury)
consumption and should be taxed. On the other hand, a foreigner’s trip to Boracay
is exports and should be exempt. This confusion is what comes from taking the
industry rather than the transaction as the unit of analysis.
A simpler and superior system would have been simply to subject both national
and foreign carriers to a VAT when selling to Filipinos, exempting sales to
foreigners, and allowing VAT credits on foreign sales. This would remove both the
disadvantage to national carriers when selling to foreigners, whether at home or
abroad. It would also give away no more revenue than is absolutely required by the
demands of competitiveness. At the very least, however, given the complex
issues involved, this matter should have undergone further study and discussion,
rather than being merely smuggled in given the rush to pass the VAT
amendments.
(

The justification for the remainder of the proposals is even more tenuous. We
have already discussed the folly of favouring selected goods supposedly
consumed by the poor (item 6). These are as likely to benefit the non-poor
(including their producers) as the poor in whose behalf they have supposedly been
proposed.
The rationale for adjusting the ceilings on VAT-exempt sales, “low-cost” housing,
and “low-rent” housing, for example, (items 3, 4, 5) might be described as sheer
inertia. Although these were justified in the past as being “pro-poor”, the incidence
or impact of these pre-existing exemptions has never been investigated to begin
with. What has been the distribution of housing sales in the relevant ranges, say,
P50,000-P1o0,0000, versus P1 million-1.5 million? How many poor and non-poor
people fall under each category? How have these patterns changed since 1995?
Have any studies been conducted that justify raising these ceilings? Finally, how
much of this is really the result of special pleading on the part of real-estate
contractors and housing developers with strong backers in congress?
© Even more incomprehensible is the decision by congress to co-mingle
proposals unrelated to VAT with discussions of the VAT measure. Hence among
others there are proposals to scrap already existing gross receipts taxes on
international carriers (Table 5, items 8 and 9) as well as the franchise taxes on
electric utilities like Meralco (item 10). Of course the most outrageous measure –
risible were it not so brazen – is the inclusion of a proposal to scrap the
amusement tax on cabarets and night-clubs (item 11). What the urgent motivation
for such a measure and its relationship to VAT could be is anyone’s guess.
Almost as frivolous and ill-conceived is the proposal first to raise then to lower the
corporate-income tax rate (item 7). Again this is no more than tokenism and
pandering. As it is, the country’s the country’s corporate income tax rates are on
the high side in a context where the rest of the world’s are on a downtrend. They
are also among the most plagued by tax evasion. Raising rates merely further
penalises those who are already complying and allows evaders simply to get away
with more. Moreover, the time-bound promise to first raise and then lower taxes
can only be feckless or downright harmful: feckless because it assumes it can
credibly bind the policies of any future administration; and harmful to the extent that
the uncertainty it creates could induce a postponement of investment decisions.
Such proposals are unworthy of the legislature and should not be taken seriously.
These brazen attempts at log-rolling not only sabotage the government’s plans at a
critical time when it is pressed to earn more revenue, they also profoundly
undermine faith in the seriousness and objectivity of the entire legislative process.
The inclusion of non-VAT-related items is particularly deplorable, first, since they
unnecessarily give up revenue already earned by the government; but secondly,
they risk placing the process in a legal limbo, for the farther the senate bill deviates
from and improvises upon the bills already passed by the house, the greater is the
likelihood that constitutional questions will be raised and that the emanating law will
be challenged in the courts, creating a logjam on the issue that the economy can ill
afford.
Eliminating exemptions: some difficult issues
While the principle of broadening the base of the VAT by removing exemptions
cannot be denied, a good deal of apprehension and uncertainty has attended the
proposal to subject two major items to the VAT system, namely, petroleum
products and electricity generation. There is good reason to be circumspect
regarding these products and services, first, since these are almost universally
used commodities; hence large increases in their prices could have potentially far
-reaching effects in the economy. Second, however, these commodities are
already the subject of specific taxes and other impositions, which themselves
need to be re-examined.
Petroleum products
The current set-up exempts final and raw petroleum products from VAT, instead
imposing various levels of specific taxes on them, ranging from P4.35 per litre of
unleaded gasoline to P1.63 per litre for diesel to 60 centavos and 30 centavos per
litre of kerosene and fuel oil, respectively. In the case of unleaded gasoline, the
specific tax is as much as 19 percent of the value of the product, although even
P4.35 (about 8 US cents) per litre is still less than what other countries impose on
similar products (e.g., about 10 and 15 US cents and for Thailand and Malaysia,
respectively).
Estimates of the revenues to be earned from including petroleum products and
their inputs in the VAT system vary from P20 billion to 29 billion, depending on
what one assumes about collection efficiency. There are, however, sound
reasons apart from generating revenue for subsuming petroleum and its raw
materials to VAT, which incidentally is common practice elsewhere in the world.
For one, unlike the present system of excises, the VAT would give users of
petroleum products (notably electricity generators) some relief in the form of tax
credits. By the same token, the crediting of VAT inputs creates a paper trail that
facilitates monitoring and efficient collection. Finally, unlike a system of specific
taxes, an ad valorem tax like VAT makes the revenue system more buoyant, i.e..,
rising or falling with the product’s value as a matter of course. As with the “sin
taxes”, the failure to update specific taxes on petroleum is one of the major
reasons that revenue effort has fallen off.
In principle, the specific excises themselves need updating; these have not been
adjusted since 1996. Indeed we have gone on record as supporting an increase in
the current excise on gasoline (excepting fuel used by electricity generators) by
P2 per litre, a move we estimated could generate P12 billion. This option need not
be given up. As a matter of principle, both should be in place, i.e., a VAT on
petroleum products for uniform treatment, and an excise tax to reflect the
additional cost to society imposed by the use of fossil fuels, as is also the case
with tobacco and alcohol products.
In practice, however, the current specific taxes on final petroleum products were
functioning in lieu of VAT. For this reason and as a transitional measure while
world oil prices remain high, it should suffice for the moment simply to capture the
entire petroleum sector in the VAT net without cutting the excise on petroleum.
One roughly makes up for the other: just as an initially bloated excise tax used to
fulfil the consumption-tax functions of a VAT, so too can inclusion in the VAT
system replace the updating of an outdated excise.
The complication posed by current proposals from the senate is that they remove
the excises on bunker, diesel, and kerosene even as they subsume these
products to the VAT. Hence against the prospective gain from including these
products in the VAT system, one must set off the losses from the removal of the
excises. One must be careful not to double count the VAT revenues, since the
amounts that will actually be credited as input-VAT are highly uncertain. It is not
difficult to construct plausible scenarios in which the additional revenues, after
netting out excise-tax losses and input-VAT, are negative or minuscule.
Timing moreover is essential. If gasoline is included in VAT, it is not unlikely that,
contrary to the senate’s proposal, the excise on gasoline, just like that on diesel,
will also be reduced. Doing this at a time when petroleum prices are high and
rising increases the political cost and makes revenue-slippage even more likely. A
wiser course would be to affirm the principle but to postpone the actual inclusion
of the entire petroleum product sector until a time that the economy will have
adjusted to higher world oil prices.
Electricity generation
Like petroleum products, power-generation has thus far also been VAT-free.
There are no special reasons on equity or efficiency grounds why it should be.
The complication presented by the taxation of this commodity is largely one of
timing and circumstance. The entire power sector is currently undergoing a major
transformation under the electrical power industry restructuring act. An essential
element is the imposition of a universal charge (UC) on all power generated which,
under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), is expected to be in place
by next year. There are various valid purposes this impost will serve , but its
principal component will go toward amortising the huge residual debt (“stranded
costs”) remaining after the privatisation of that national tragedy that is the National
Power Corporation (NPC). This passing-on of the burden of NPC’s mistakes to the
electricity users will mean that for a significant period of time, electricity will be
priced artificially higher than it should be.
The big difference between petroleum and electricity, therefore, is that unlike the
former, whose pre-tax domestic price is broadly in line with world prices, electricity
is already artificially expensive even before it is taxed. For this reason, there can
be a genuine debate about whether power ought to be folded into the VAT system
as long as the universal charge will be levied. To impose both a universal charge
and the VAT in this case would unduly discourage power consumption and impose
an additional burden when there is no economic or social reason for doing so.
Nor is this conclusion altered by the simple-minded attempt of the house to
prevent a pass-through of the proposed VAT on power to consumers. Apart from
being deplorable economics – it turns a consumption tax into a tax on producers –
this stratagem is in any case unlikely to prosper legally and smacks frankly of a
crude show to please the gallery.
The choice then is clear: if the VAT is to be imposed, the UC must be given up; if
the UC stays, then VAT-inclusion must be foregone, or at least phased in only as
the UC diminishes. The equivalence between the two imposts becomes even
clearer if one considers that the purpose of collecting the UC hardly differs from
that of raising the VAT, which is to reduce the government’s indebtedness (which
in turn includes the indebtedness of NPC). As a corollary, in the larger picture of
raising revenues to stabilise the debt, the proceeds from a possible VAT on
power cannot be regarded as an undiluted gains; they must be set off against a
possible loss of the proceeds from the universal charge.
Clearly then the case for including power and petroleum in the VAT system exists,
but it may be tempered by other considerations – a transitory circumstance in one,
a political one in the other. In the immediate term, there may be good reasons to
hold off on the inclusion of these sectors. For petroleum, government may want to
wait for an opportune time when the price of petroleum is on the downtrend. For
power, government may wish to calibrate the VAT against the eventual phase-out
of the universal electricity charge. In the event, that two important candidates for
exemption-delisting are problematic suggests at the least that a more careful study
and that a precipitate decision is unwise. In turn, a postponement of a decision on
these matters only underscores the importance of raising the VAT rate now on
items currently covered.
Beyond these, new proposals to exempt certain industries from VAT or to grant
them lower rates will generally impair either revenue collection or redistributive
equity. In this case it is poised to do both, losing revenue and serving the rich,
therefore it should be viewed with extreme suspicion. Caveat civis! The guideline
to observe at this time should be the following: if one is unable to reduce the
scope of exemptions, one should at least not add to them.
The plea then is to keep things simple: the VAT is bound to bite into consumers’
pockets – if it did not do so, it would not be a consumption tax. But it does so for a
larger purpose – to stave off a crisis and contribute funds for social development
and infrastructure. Congress should just let the tax do its job of raising revenue as
simply, uniformly, and universally as possible. This means raising rates and
reducing, not increasing exemptions. In the meantime there is no shortage of other
means to alleviate any ill effects the tax may occasion. Helping the poor, helping
small businesses, even helping big airlines may be priorities that congress deems
important. Income and wealth taxes, implemented effectively, can redistribute
income; well-targeted social subsidies and programmes can alleviate poverty. And
government has certainly found other effective ways to help people like Mr. Lucio
Tan both in the past and more recently. For now, therefore, they should do well to
leave the spirit and structure of VAT alone.
The chimera: expanded coverage in lieu of a higher rate?
In this entire debate, the most seductive suggestion has come from those who
contend that it is a real option not to increase the current VAT rate, if only the
coverage of VAT were expanded and exemptions removed. As already argued
above, any expansion of the scope of the current VAT should be generally
supported. What is wrong and misleading, however, is to think – given the
magnitude of the fiscal problem – that an increase in the rate can be avoided.
Adequacy demands that the VAT rate be raised and that exemptions be
withdrawn.
Proponents of the broadening-only idea contend that just casting the VAT net
more widely would yield an additional P24 billion which, in addition to the
exemptions in Table 2 worth P27.6 billion would yield as much as P51.6 billion,.
i.e., the first line in Table 2 replaced by the last line in Table 4 gives (27.64 + 24.12
= 51.6). Table 4 details the additional Senate proposals. It is evident, however that
virtually all of this expected additional revenue (94 percent) is supposed to come
from a single item: the “spreading out” of the crediting of the VAT on capital
equipment.
Table 6.
Senate proposals for additional withdrawals of VAT exemptions
VAT exemptions to be withdrawn from: Yield
P bn
Nonfood agriculture products 0.74
Services by agricultural contract growers 2.95
Personal & household effects and professional instruments negl.
Water and air transport of passengers 1.54
Spread out the crediting of input-VAT on capital equipment 22.58
Total 24.12
Source: Department of Finance, March 2005.
Considering the saliency of this proposal in the argument over the necessity of a
higher rate, it is worth dissecting. Under the current system, companies that invest
are allowed to immediately credit the VAT they paid on their capital-equipment
purchases. It may then occur that a firm’s input-VAT credits may exceed its VAT
due on sales so that it remits nothing to the government in the current year.
Suppose for example that a company would normally remit P100,000 as its VAT
payments for the year; it could happen however that in this very year, it purchased
a piece of equipment worth P1 million, a price inclusive of a VAT of 10 percent , or
P100,000. Current practice then allows the firm to offset this VAT on capital
equipment against the VAT remittance it would have made, so that the firm does
not remit any VAT at all this year.
The senate proposes to prohibit this practice. Hence a business would no longer
be allowed to credit – as it normally could – the entire VAT it has paid on its
investment purchases (e.g., machines, construction) in the same year these are
made. Rather it must credit these only in instalments over a five-year period.
Hence, the company in the example above would be prevented from claiming
P100,000 as a VAT credit immediately in the current year; rather it could claim only
P20,000 in additional VAT credits annually over the next five years. In purely
nominal terms, of course, the sum of all credits is the same over five years.
Effectively, however, any company making an investment would be forced pay
VAT on its purchases up front without immediate offset. This amounts to
extending a loan to the government equal to the opportunity cost of the funds tied
up in its impounded VAT credits. The size of this compulsory loan increases with
the investment being made and the prevailing interest rate. For interest rates
between 15 and 25 percent, for example, a business could forego an additional
23 to 33 centavos for every peso of creditable VAT compared with the present
rules. The upshot of this is to penalise investment by effectively taxing it. Between
two otherwise identical firms, one of which makes an investment while the other
does not, the latter by not investing can avoid tying up its funds unnecessarily in a
forced loan to the government.
In their zeal to show that revenue can be earned without a VAT higher rate,
proponents of this shrewd measure have accomplished the seemingly impossible:
they have managed to employ a consumption tax to tax investment instead – all
this in a bid to rescue a somewhat desperate notion. Yet even then it fails to
deliver honestly, since the estimates of potential gain to the government are
probably overstated. First, the initial rise in revenues from this measure will not be
an annually recurring one. The one-time revenue boost comes from the fact that
companies will not be allowed to credit their input-VAT all at once and must
therefore in the meantime remit a larger amount to government. Eventually
however they will be allowed to use those credits, albeit gradually, so that the
government stands to earn a smaller amount in all succeeding periods. The
government’s gain consists merely in getting some revenue up front rather than
later; it gains liquidity in the present but this is not sustained into the future.
Second, given the disincentive to investment that the measure represents, one
should wonder whether the estimated take is likely to be as large as its proponents
make it out to be. Such a measure is more than likely to reduce the appetite to
invest, and therefore at least partly reduce the base from which it intends to
collect.
The most important objection to this proposal, however, is that it threatens to
knock out one of the major props to long-term confidence in the economy. The
“consumption-led” character of recent growth has been a cause for concern, and
the government itself has pointed to a need to shift the sources of growth towards
spending that has a greater impact for the long term. By imposing a hidden
investment tax – which is what the measure amounts to – the government can only
interrupt the momentum of nascent capital spending in many sectors and imperil
the sustainability of the very growth it is so ready to proclaim.
In the end, therefore, one must again confront the hard fact that there is no magic
bullet, no painless potion that will allow the country to evade a higher VAT. The
alternatives are either worse (a sudden slip towards crisis, or a slow squeeze on
social spending) or – as this measure turns out to be – largely illusory.
To reiterate, therefore, our proposed approach to the issue of VAT amendment is
to “keep things simple” and may be summarised as follows:
(a) first and foremost, increase the VAT rate to 12 percent from the existing
10 percent;
(

support the principle but postpone the inclusion of petroleum products
and electricity generation under the VAT system;
© accept all other proposals to reduce the number of exemptions to the
VAT;
(d) reject all other proposals to lengthen the list of VAT-exempt, zero-rated,
or VAT-privileged goods; in particular reject any attempt to experiment with a multi
-tier rate system;
(e) resist proposals to implicate or “trade-off” with VAT any other revenue-
losing measures, particularly those involving downward adjustments of excise
taxes, franchise taxes, or income taxes
Fiscal crisis revisited
It is appropriate, at this point, to step back and look at the big picture. In late
August last year, some of the present authors co-wrote a paper that raised the
warning that the economy could confront a financial crisis a few years down the
road if the government failed to take bold steps to fix the fiscal mess. Using
historical trends, the “UP-11” paper estimated that the government needed to
raise additional revenues equivalent to 2.9 percent of GDP. That amount explicitly
provided for an added one-percent of GDP earmarked for social services and
infrastructure. The increment needed to avert a crisis was thus put at 1.9 percent
of GDP , which as needed to obtain a primary surplus (i.e., budget surplus
excluding interest payments) equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP needed to stabilise
public debt.
The course taken by revenues, primary spending and balances since then is given
in Table 7. On the face of it, the economy made progress in approaching its goal
of sustainability: between 2003 and 2004 the primary surplus in fact rose from 0.6
to 1.5 percent of GDP (Table 1, line 3). Moreover, if the approved budget for 2005
is implemented, this trend is bound to continue so that by the end of this year,
particularly if one includes the revised “sin” taxes and the passage of a serious
VAT bill, the country stands to “over-achieve” its fiscal sustainability targets for
2005 and possibly attain a primary surplus in excess of 3.5 percent (Table 7,
Column A). Indeed even without the VAT, a primary surplus of almost 3 percent
might be attainable (Column

.
Table 7
Fiscal crisis redux
(items reported as percent of current GDP)
2003 2004 Scenarios
A B C D
1. Primary spending 13.95 12.86 11.26a 11.26a 13.95 13.86
2. Revenue 14.58 14.41 15.07b 14.21 15.07 16.21
3. Primary surplus 0.63 1.55 3.73 2.95 1.12 2.35
Broken down as follows:
4. Previous primary balance -- 0.63 1.55 1.55 1.55
1.55
5. Plus: cut (or: rise) in primary spending 1.09 1.61 1.61
(1.1) (1.0)
6. Plus: new revenues -- 0.86b 0.12b 0.86b
2.0
7. Less: regular revenue slippage (0.17) (0.2)c (0.2) c
(0.2)c (0.2)c
a = based on approved 2005 budget
b = sin taxes equal to 0.12 and and VAT 0.74 percent respectively of 2005 GDP
c = revenue effort assumed to slip annually by 0.2 percent without new measures
Column A: assume primary-spending cuts in 2005 budget and passage of VAT
and sin taxes
Column B: assume primary-spending cuts in 2005 budget without VAT
Column C: restore 2003 levels of primary spending and pass VAT and sin taxes
Column D: restore 2003 levels of primary spending with recommended 2-percent
additional revenue
Some could choose to interpret these data in reassuring terms to say that the
crisis is over; indeed, others might utilise them to argue that no new revenues –
not even the VAT amendment – are really needed. But all such inferences would
be self-deceiving, since as already noted in the beginning, this “feat” is founded
on a single stratagem: spending compression. This fact makes it artificial and
unsustainable. For it is unreasonable – indeed anti-people and anti-development –
to believe that such low levels of government provision of public goods can be
indefinitely maintained. One only needs to look in on the physical and intellectual
state of basic public education to see how, by this means, Filipino children are
daily being robbed of their future. Nor do we need to mention the deplorable state
of primary health, the penal system, and transport infrastructure in this country. At
the other extreme, one might also wonder how long congress can reconcile itself
with a reduced-pork budget.
An indication of how tenuous the fiscal situation remains may be seen from the
following thought-experiment: suppose levels of primary spending were only to be
restored to those of 2003 (ca. 14 percent of GDP). Then the primary surplus
would shrink to no more than 1.1 percent of GDP (Column C), a figure well below
the 2.5-percent benchmark for fiscal sustainability. At which point the wolves would
again be baying at the country’s door. This simple Gedankenexperiment also
demonstrates that the revenue efforts thus far – even with a VAT revision passed
–are barely enough to provide the needed cushion for sustainability. Things would,
of course, be even worse if no VAT revision was passed (primary surplus
shrinking to about four-tenths of a percent of GDP). Such precarious numbers are
almost certain not to impress financial markets, for they are bound to see that the
only consequence of such self-injurious actions in the long run is either crippled
development or political unrest, or both.
Our preferred scenario would have been to front-load the raising of additional
revenues of as much as two percent of GDP, while simultaneously raising primary
spending by one percent of GDP. As a result (shown as Column D) revenue effort
would rise to 16.2 percent and primary spending to 13.9 percent, yielding a
primary surplus of about 2.3 percent. On the one hand. the credible rise in revenue
effort would serve to reassure the international finance community; on the other
hand, the people’s present and future needs would not be unduly sacrificed.
Current developments do not however point to this preferred scenario. Instead
what is immediately shaping up – assuming crucially that the VAT amendment
passes – is that deep spending cuts may serve to stabilise financial expectations
– for the moment, anyway. The threat of a crisis will have been postponed for a
year, though that will still leave the government to deal with people’s frustrations
over the inadequacy of public-goods provision. Then the situation would still be
serious – but not hopeless.
Conclusion
In the experience of countries that have recently confronted fiscal and financial
crises – Argentina, Turkey, and Brazil – the difference between deliverance and
collapse often revolved around no more than two percent or so of GDP. Historians
of such events may find it curious that the steps needed to avert tragedy were,
upon hindsight, relatively minor when set off against the severe crises that those
societies subsequently had to endure. But situations are not unknown – bank runs
are a related phenomenon – when even small changes suffice to decide between
vastly different outcomes.
At bottom is always the issue whether an adequate deal can be brokered that will
be regarded as fair and acceptable by important parts of the population. But when
political institutions have typically delivered only biased and flawed results in
normal times, they cannot be expected to command trust and support when they
demand sacrifices of the populace in a crisis. Much of this unfortunately applies to
the Philippines as well. The question is, first, whether the country’s political elite
can look beyond their smaller concerns and realize the gravity of the situation and
second, whether this leadership can craft a package that the rest of the country
can accept. The latter entails that the proposals must be viewed as fairly
apportioning the burden. On both counts, in the Philippines, the record thus far has
been mixed.
Yet the stakes have never been more tantalizing. For the economy now genuinely
seems to be on a cusp, an odd moment during which things could just as easily
turn for the worse as get better. Ironically the financial markets are almost aching
to favour the Philippines; this fact that can be partly seen in the peso’s recent
strength, as well as in the relatively mild treatment the country received from
ratings agencies. What is required to complete the job, however, is a convincing
fiscal turnaround, an indispensable component of which in turn is a credible VAT
measure. The Philippines could then become one of the few sovereign borrowers
in the world that offered attractive premiums without the concomitant risk of default.
The high cost of the last bond issue has not dispelled the impression that the
country’s offerings have junk-bond status. We might then cash in on one case of
positive history: the country’s reputation of never having reneged on its debt (not
even during the debt crisis of the mid-1980s). From that point on, any or all of the
following would be plausible: (a) avoidance of a further downgrade and instead an
improvement to ASEAN standards of the terms at which government borrowed
abroad; (

a new stage when the government might simply borrow in local
currency, purchasing foreign exchange it needed from current account surpluses
and foreign portfolios moving into holding domestic paper. It is not far-fetched to
imagine the side of the cusp where the economy starts to become burdened by an
over-strong currency, bid up by foreign inflows. That situation would present
problems of its own which need not be confronted now.
On the other hand, that scenario could just as easily vanish if the government failed
to seize the moment and to act decisively. The economy could just as likely slide
down the cusp’s other half if no credible revenue measure was passed – more
specifically if the much-awaited VAT amendment carried no increase in rates, or
was seriously impaired by major exemptions, or entailed such innovations that its
effective implementation was placed in doubt. Then the scenario would revert to a
gradual or rapid deterioration in credit standing, increasing debt, further spending
contraction, all of which would bring this country that much closer to a real
payments collapse.
Increasing the chances of a favourable scenario involves not only the current
question of passing a credible VAT amendment. Beyond this, it involves moving
away from the overworked and short-sighted device of simply compressing
spending to meet a fiscal exigency. What is required, arithmetically, is a significant
and permanent rise in the revenue effort in the order of at least 2.0-2.5 percent of
GDP, an amount that would permit a palpable increase in spending on human-
development and infrastructure priorities. Given the widespread cynicism about
government, however, such resources will be forthcoming only if the political
leadership, particularly the chief executive, can articulate a coherent and reliable
plan regarding where exactly such new resources shall be directed. In particular,
the eventual inclusion of fossil fuels and electricity generation in the VAT system,
the adjustments of vario